## Message Text

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 154
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 GENEVA 6784

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CORRECTED COPY (SECTION 1 OF 3 VICE 1 OF 2)

EO 11652: XGDS-1 TAGS: PARM SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S MAIN STATEMENT OF AUGUST 9, 1977 (SALT TWO - 1331)

THE FOLLOWING IS MAIN STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF AUGUST 91 1977:

SEMENOV'S MAIN STATEMENT, AUGUST 9, 1977

I

THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS THE SOVIET UNION HAS CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATED ASSUMPTION UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT OF MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT AND ON NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES. THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE STATED IN ARTICLES XII AND XIII OF THE DRAFT.

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THE USSR DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY PRESENTED DETAILED ARGUMENTS IN SUBSTANTIATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AFORE-MENTIONED ARTICLES, AT THE MEETINGS OF MAY 13, 17 AND 31, 1977 AMONG OTHERS. THESE QUESTIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN DISCUSSED REPEATEDLY AT MEETINGS BETWEEN HEADS OF DELEGATION AND BETWEEN MEMBERS AND STAFFS OF THE DELEGATIONS. THE U.S. SIDE IS AWARE OF ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS.

IT IS UNDENIABLE THAT OBLIGATIONS ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER ARE AN IMPORTANT GUARANTEE OF THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT. THEY MUST RELIABLY BLOCK ALL CHANNELS FOR WEAKENING OR UNDERMINING THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE OBLIGATIONS PROPOSED BY THE USSR ARE ENTIRELY BASED ON THE FUNDEMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AND ARE AIMED AT STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY AND AT INCREASING TRUST IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S., AS WELL AS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A WHOLE.

THEY ALSO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR ACCOMPLISHING THE TASKS PUT BEFORE US IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREED ARTICLE XV ON SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ADOPTING FURTHER MEASURES TO LIMIT AND REDUCE STRATEGIC ARMS.

BEING CONSISTENT WITH GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THEY ARE STRICTLY IN ACCORD WITH THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WITH THE POLICY OF STRENGTHENING THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, WHICH HAS BEEN CONFIRMED IN A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL AND SOVIET-U.S. DOCUMENTS.

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WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE NEW AGREEMENT DID NOT CONTAIN THE PRECISELY WORDED PROVISIONS ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER, BEING PROPOSED IN ARTICLES XII AND XIII OF THE DRAFT? THE ANSWER IS OBVIOUS.

IN THAT CASE AN OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE RETAINED FOR ACTIONS WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY LEAD TO MAJOR CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, WHILE ATTEMPTS TO ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL

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STRATEGIC POTENTIAL, AND THEREFORE A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WOULD UNDERMINE THE VERY BASIS OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THAT BALANCE BETWEEN THE SIDES IN THE AREA OF LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED IN VLADIVOSTOK. THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE USSR AND THE U.S., BUT ALSO TO THOSE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AS A WHOLE.

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER ARE MAJOR QUESTIONS OF GREAT FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT UNDER PREPARATION. THE SOVIET UNION REGARDS NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER AS MOST IMPORTANT AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND DOES NOT CONCEIVE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WITHOUT MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS ON THIS SCORE.

IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, THE SIDES ASSUME AN OBLIGATION NOT TO TAKE ACTION WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WEAKENED OR CIRCUMVENTED THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER.

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IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT EACH SIDE ASSUME AN OBLIGATION NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES, AND NOT TO ASSIST IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, IN PARTICULAR, BY TRANSFERRING COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUE-PRINTS FOR THESE ARMS.

NATURALLY, THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLES XII AND XIII MUST APPLY TO THE ARMS COVERED BOTH BY THE AGREEMENT AND BY THE PROTOCOL THERETO; THIS COULD BE RECORDED, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FORM OF ANAGREED STATEMENT.

IT FOLLOWS FROM THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD THAT THE SIDES AGREE IN PRINCIPLE THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN

OBLIGATIONS ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER. THE U.S. DELEGATION STATED THAT IN THE NEAR FUTURE IT WILL BE PREPARED TO GIVE SPECIFIC CONSIDERATION TO THE PROVISIONS DEALING WITH NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER. WE ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE WITHOUT DELAY IN A BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION OF THE FORMULATIONS OF ARTICLES XII AND XIII, FOR INCLUSION IN THE TEXT OF THE JOINT DRAFT. IT IS NOW UP TO THE U.S. SIDE.

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MR. AMBASSADOR.

AS YOU KNOW, THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT AS OF AUGUST 5, 1977 ALSO CONTAINS THE PROPOSALS OF THE SIDES ON MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS. THIS MATTER WAS REFERRED TO THE DELEGATIONS QUITE RECENTLY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S.

SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS ON THIS SCORE.

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IN THE PREAMBLE TO THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, BY WAY OF AN OBJECTIVE, THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR DESIRE TO TAKE MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER LIMITATION AND FOR THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF A POLICY, THE AIM OF WHICH IS PRECISELY LIMITATION OF, AND NOT A BUILDUP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS IN ACCORD WITH THE THRUST OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT, AND ENSURES ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND SIGNIFICANCE AS AN IMPORTANT INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. THIS IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE APPROACH TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED FOR THE SIDES UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

WE ARE IN FAVOR OF INCLUDING THE OBLIGATIONS BEING WORKED OUT UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT IN A SINGLE DOCUMENT HAVING A TERM THROUGH 1985. THE U.S. SIDE HAS PROPOSED THAT, ALONG WITH THE BASIC AGREEMENT, A DOCUMENT BE WORKED OUT FOR A SHORTER TERM, UNDER WHICH LIMITATIONS ON SOME TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE ADOPTED, WITH A VIEW TO CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE ARMS DURING THAT TERM, GUIDED BY THE AFOREMENTIONED OBJECTIVE. THIS U.S. PROPOSAL WAS ADOPTED AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN GENEVA IN MAY 1977.

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSED HERE THAT, PENDING AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS QUESTION IN ITS ENTIRETY, A MUTUAL OBLIGATION BE ASSUMED NOT TO TEST OR DEPLOY MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS OR MISSILES FOR SUCH LAUNCHERS FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS, I.E., AN OBLIGATION WITH THE FRAMEWORK OF A PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT. CLEARLY, SUCH AN INTERRELATED AND STRICT SYSTEM OF BOLIGATIONS WOULD ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS MEASURES AS A DEFINITE STEP IN THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EUQAL SECURITY.

TO BAN ONLY THE DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS WOULD MEAN TO RETAIN A BASIS FOR ACTIVITIES AIMED AT CONTINUING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH AN APPROACH TO THE LIMITATION OF MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS CANNOT BUT GIVE RISE TO OBJECTIONS.

IN PRACTICAL TERMS THIS COULD POTENTIALLY CREATE PRE-REQUISITES FOR EXCEEDING THE LEVELS PROVIDED FOR BY THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, ALTHOUGH EVEN NOW THE SIDES ARE PROVIDING FOR STEPS AIMED AT LOWERING THESE LEVELS. THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD THUS CONTINUE, ONLY SECRET

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ON A DIFFERENT PLANE.

AT THE SAME TIME, INASMUCH AS THE QUESTION OF MOBILE

ICBM LAUNCHERS IS TO BE RESOLVED DURING THIS TERM THAT DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION IT TO BE CONTINUED, IT IS COMPLETELY INAPPROPRIATE TO INCLUDE IN THE BASIC AGREEMENT PROVISIONS PERMITTING SUCH ICBM LAUNCHERS.

AFGTER ALL, THE IDEA OF A PROTOCOL WITH A THREE-YEAR TERM AROSE PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS AGREED TO POSTPONE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS UNTIL EXPIRATION OF THE PROTOCOL.

THE PERDETERMINE THE RESULTS OF THE UPCOMING CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS WOULD BE TO DISTORT THE ESSENCE OF THE EXISTING SOVIET-U.S. UNDERSTANDING IN THIS CONNECTION.

THUS, INASMUCH, AS THE QUESTION OF MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS WILL BE RESOLVED IN THE PROTOCOL WHICH WILL BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE TEXT OF THE BASIC AGREEMENT MUST NOT CONTAIN PROVISIONS PERMITTING SUCH ARMS; OTHERWISE THE VERY IDEA OF A PROTOCOL, AT LEAST WITH RESPECT TO MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS, LOSES ITS MEANING.

WE PROCEED FORM THE PREMISE THAT DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF RECORDING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT A DECISION REGARDING MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS WILL BE CONTINUED WITH AN ACCOUNT FOR THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE USSR DELEGATION TODAY.

NOTE: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT AND STATEMENT ON REDUCTIONS TO FOLLOW IN SEPTELS. EARLE SECRET

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